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Introduction.  
Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) in their «Public finance in theory and practice» classified the tax 
incidence as statutory incidence, determining the statutory obligation for economic agents to pay 
taxes, and effective incidence, which refers to the tax bearer – a person who really bears this tax 
burden (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989, 237). 
The obligation to pay taxes far from always means that such tax agent bears an appropriate tax 
burden. Therefore, the question of tax incidence arises. Corporate income tax (CIT) incidence can 
have either direct or indirect impact on workers. The direct impact relates to the change of 
employment income, while the implicit effect concerns changes of employment conditions arising 
when a company does not cut wages. This can result to the decrease in labor productivity and average 
value added per worker, which in turn can lead to the slowdown in economic growth. Therefore, the 
paper aims to investigate the relationship between level of corporate taxation (in terms of corporate 
income tax rate) and labor market indicators in countries worldwide to identify the suggested 
corporate tax incidence and its potential causes.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides research background on incidence of the 
corporate tax on labor for both the open and closed economy cases. Section III describes 
methodology, and Section IV provides results of empirical analysis of relationship between corporate 
taxation and labor market indicators in countries. Section V concludes. 
1. Research Background 
After introducing the capital income tax in 1909, which differed from existing indirect and property 
taxes, the issues of its incidence arose. The popular opinion was that in the short-term there was no 
incidence of such tax on workers. The partial equilibrium models were the main instrument of 
estimation of incidence. The first attempt to use the general equilibrium model in order to analyze the 
incidence of capital income tax was done by Harberger (1962). He provided both a theoretical analysis 
of the effects of the corporation income tax and estimation of its probable incidence in the United 
States. He developed a general-equilibrium model with corporate and non-corporate industries 
(sectors), each employing two factors of production, labor and capital. The realization of model with 
an example of the United States allowed him to conclude that capital bears close to the full burden of 
the tax.  
The Harberger’s conclusions related to the incidence of capital income tax on labor remained 
generally acknowledged until the growth of globalization and the increased number of international 
economic agreements had put the issue of openness of the economy in the forefront in the analysis of 
macroeconomic processes (Melvin (1982), Grubert and Mutti (1985) etc.) 
In theory, any source-based capital tax in the small open economy is inefficient (Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1971)), and the share of the corporate tax burden falling on domestic immobile factors 
increases (compared to closed economy case). Thus, if the country has no market power on the world 
markets, the after-tax rate of return to capital is fixed. Moreover, if such a country raises the corporate 
income tax, this results in decrease in domestic investment and the increase of pre-tax rate of return 
to investment. The latest will rise until the domestic after-tax rate of return will equal the international 
after-tax rate of return. This means that the corporate income tax burden is fully shifted to domestic 
immobile factors of production, which include immobile labor or land. In the open economy, the tax 
distorts both the domestic and the international allocation of capital. In the long-run the marginal 
productivity of labor and, consequently, the wages (according to the theoretical assumptions) will 
decrease. This lead to the decrease in labor demand, and the corporate tax burden born by labor, will 
rise. 
Harberger itself (1995, 2008) revised the incidence of corporate income tax in an open economy 
having been stated that the openness of a state should be regarded as a crucial factor in analyzing the 
incidence of corporate taxation. He found that domestic labor often bears the full burden of the 
corporate tax and that a larger burden on capital reduces both the degree of international capital 
mobility and the degree of substitutability between domestic and importing goods.  
Further research providing empirical estimation of corporate tax incidence on labor used mainly 
the general equilibrium models. And the obtained results varied widely. Some of them confirmed 
Harberger’s findings (Randolph (2006), Felix (2009), McKenzie and Ferede (2017)), others (Fuest 
(2011), Fuest, Peichl, and Siegloch (2016) demonstrated that the labor bears an essential share of the 
corporate tax burden, but reject an assumption that the corporate tax falls primarily on business 
owners). Finally, Gravelle and Smetters (2006), Gravelle (2013), Agarwal and Chakraborty (2017) 
etc. argued that the corporate tax falls largely on capital income, which is similar to the closed 
economy case. 
When the small open economy faces the perfectly elastic supply of capital, the corporate income 
tax burden is shifted to factors other than capital. The latter will continue to move abroad until its 
domestic after-tax return would equal the world return. Such decrease of capital will lead to the lower 
marginal productivity of labor, and, in turn, if the capital is perfectly mobile, the corporate income 
tax burden will be fully shifted into the labor.  
In contrast, when the economy is large, the high corporate income tax could reduce an 
international after-tax rate of return. As a result, the immobile factors of production again bear a part 
of corporate tax burden, but in such a case, the capital owners will also lose, while immobile factors 
owners in other countries with capital inflow will benefit. Workers on the domestic labor market will 
bear the burden since the most part of them cannot move freely between countries and domestic wages 
will fall. At the same time, in the foreign labor market the foreign workforce benefits from the 
increase of foreign capital. 
Thus, in general, according to Fuest (2015), the open economy models predict that “the smaller 
is the country imposing the tax relative to the world or domestic economy…the larger is the burden 
on immobile factors” (Fuest, 2015, p.8). 
Another set of papers use wage bargaining models (Brenzel, Gartner, and Schnabel (2013), 
Arulampalam et al. (2012), Fuest (2015)) in order to analyze the impact of corporate income tax 
changes on wages. In general their results indicate that the enhancing of bargaining power of 
companies weakens the incidence of corporate income tax; however these models do not consider 
both an open economy and capital mobility. However, when the economy is open, a company has the 
possibility to shift both production, and capital abroad; this could improve its bargaining position. 
This means, according to Exbrayat et al. (2016) the direct tax incidence, which increases with the 
level of economic integration. In competitive labor markets, the indirect incidence of corporate 
income tax arises from variations in the capital-to-labor ratio (invested in each country), when the 
capital outflow from a high tax country reduces the marginal productivity of labor in smaller tax 
country and strengthen thereby such corporate tax incidence. Nevertheless, when the labor cost is 
taken into account the tax cuts could not lead to the expected results, notably to prevent capital 
outflow. The question is that countries raise corporate income tax rates in order to lower domestic 
labor cost. I.e., when the government is concerned with lower wages one of the ways to achieve it is 
to maintain corporate income tax rates on the relatively high level (compared with other countries) 
(Lockwood and Makris, 2006; Exbrayat et al., 2016). 
Therefore, according to the existing studies, in the open economy the corporate tax burden is 
partially (or entirely) shifted onto labor. The level of incidence depends on the size of the country, on 
the degree of substitution between imported and domestic products, on the degree of factor 
substitution and the intensity of their use. The theory suggests that the increase in CIT rate means for 
companies the necessity of cutting wages for maintaining commodity prices at the same level. 
However at the same time there is a strong possibility that to maintain the certain level of wages, 
companies will manipulate the number of hired employees, terms and conditions of employment and 
dismissal, amounts of severance pay, number of working hours etc., which can lead to the decrease 
in average value added per worker. In other words, companies can shift the corporate tax burden onto 
labor by changing conditions of employment. 
Hereafter, we investigate the relationship between change of CIT rate and labor market 
indicators to identify the suggested corporate tax incidence and its potential causes.  
2. Methodology 
Our analysis includes two stages. 
I. Identification as a whole the suggested tax incidence through worsening working conditions 
by companies. The latter can be expressed numerically by labor freedom index, which is the integral 
quantitative indicator considering the impact of six factors: ratio of minimum wage to the average 
value added per worker; hindrance to hiring additional workers; rigidity of hours; difficulty of firing 
redundant employees; legally mandated notice period, and mandatory severance pay (The Labor 
Freedom Index, 2017). 
II. Analysis of each of these factors in order to identify overarching factor(s), and the nature of 
its(their) relationship with CIT rates in countries. 
Our estimations based on the data on 145 countries for 2009-2017 retrieved from KPMG, 
Deloitte and Ernst & Young, The Heritage Foundation, The International Labor Organization, and 
The World Bank databases, including Doing Business database. The methodology includes statistical 
and factor analysis, as well as comparative analysis. 
3. Case Studies 
First, we divided all countries according their level of economic development expressed as GDP per 
capita (Fig.1). 
Figure 1. Corporate tax rates, GDP per capita and labor freedom index in countries, 2016. 
 
Source: author 
Note: the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, ln⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) used to simplify visual 
comprehension  
For countries with lower GDP per capita (Fig. 1) one can observe a relatively wide dispersion 
of both CIT rates and labor freedom index, while in middle-income countries the dispersion of CIT 
rates decreases, but the dispersion of labor freedom index remains relatively wide.  
For countries with higher GDP per capita, the level of both corporate taxation and labor freedom 
tend towards their average. In general, Fig. 1 shows that the higher is GDP per capita the more is the 
impact of the CIT rate and labor freedom index.  
The change of corporate income tax rate affects virtually all components of labor freedom 
index. When the tax rate increases the company instead of reducing wages can change the number of 
working hours and their distribution (to introduce the night shift etc.), reduce the number of hired 
workers and increase the number of dismissed ones, and reduce severance pay as well. Moreover, in 
developed economies due to stable and efficient labor market institutions companies have less 
capability to manipulate the conditions of employment than in developed countries. 
To provide further analysis and to simplify visual comprehension of findings we calculated the 
ratio of labor freedom index and CIT rate (𝐿𝐶𝑛) as: 
𝐿𝐶𝑛 =
∑ 𝐿𝐹𝑖 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖
⁄𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛
, 𝑛 = 1,2,… ,𝑁⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
where 𝑁⁡is the number of countries; 𝐿𝐹𝑖 is the labor freedom index of the i-th country; 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖 is 
the corporate income tax rate of the i-th country. 
Fig. 2 presents the results of correlation analysis between labor freedom indices and CIT rates 
(as 𝐿𝐶𝑛 ratio) and GDP per capita (ln⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐)) in countries worldwide. 
Figure 2. The results of correlation analysis between labor freedom indices and CIT rates, 2016. 
 
 
Source: author 
Fig. 2 demonstrates the inverse correlation between analyzed variables. Such statistically 
significant dependence is visible even for the linear approximation – 𝑅2 > ⁡0,8; for other 
approximation types – exponential, power and logarithmic, the value of 𝑅2 is even larger.  
This means that increase of corporate tax rate leads to the reduction of labor freedom index. In 
other words, when companies for whatever reason do not want to reduce wages in response to increase 
of CIT rate they shift the CIT burden onto workers by worsening their employment conditions. 
However, such relationship varies depending on the level of GDP per capita. This means that 
for low-income and low-middle-income countries such relationship will differ from both upper-
middle-income countries and high-income countries. Said otherwise, the richer and more developed 
countries have indicators, which determine the labor freedom index and which are not aligned with 
the tax rate,  
Accordingly, they reach the same value of labor freedom index with larger tax rate, which, in 
turn, gives lower ratio of these two variables compared to other countries.  
In countries with high GDP per capita, the corporate tax burden is shifted onto workers (due to 
worsening their employment conditions) in lesser extent than in countries where GDP per capita is 
relatively low. 
 
II. At this stage we analyze specific elements of labor freedom index in order to identify the 
nature of their relationship with CIT rates in countries, and potential tax incidence.  
We found 62 countries worldwide with different levels of GDP per capita, in which the CIT 
rates have been changed during 2009-2017. 
For each country, we provide a factor analysis, starting with exclusion of factors of labor 
freedom index, which have no variance (data reduction method).  
After we analyzed the descriptive statistics (Table 1. as an example for Angola, where we 
excluded three variables with no variance) and built correlation matrices (Table 2, where three 
variables have significant correlation with CIT rate)  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Valid 
N 
Mean Min Max Variance Std.Dev. Coef.Var. Std.Error 
Standard CIT rate 8 12,5000 10,0000 15,0000 7,14286 2,672612 21,38090 0,944911 
Minimum wage for a 
full-time worker  
8 198,2255 182,3044 209,8582 70,75396 8,411537 4,24342 2,973928 
Ratio of minimum wage 
to value added per 
worker 
8 0,3855 0,3545 0,4100 0,00040 0,020048 5,20000 0,007088 
Maximum working 
days per week 
8 5,6250 5,0000 6,0000 0,12500 0,353553 6,28539 0,125000 
Paid annual leave 8 20,2500 20,0000 22,0000 0,50000 0,707107 3,49189 0,250000 
Severance pay for 
redundancy dismissal 
8 10,2944 10,1000 11,6000 0,27831 0,527548 5,12459 0,186516 
Source: author  
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
N Mean Std.Dv. r(X,Y) r2 t p 
Standard CIT rate  12,5000 2,672612 
    
Paid annual leave  8 20,2500 0,707107 -0,377964 0,142857 -1,00000 0,355918 
Severance pay for redundancy 
dismissal  
8 10,2944 0,527548 -0,371514 0,138023 -0,98017 0,364854 
Minimum wage for a full-time 
worker  
8 
204,1190 7,673855 -0,747955 0,559436 -2,76024 0,032844 
Ratio of minimum wage to value 
added per worker 
8 0,3855 0,020048 -0,925239 0,856067 -5,97378 0,000987 
Maximum working days per week 8 5,6250 0,353553 -0,755929 0,571429 -2,82843 0,030020 
Source: author  
 
The results for 62 countries showed the following tendencies (Table 3) 
Table 3. Results of statistical and factor analysis for countries with change in CIT rates 
 Factor Number of countries with significant correlation 
1 Minimum wage for a full-
time worker  
Angola, Belarus, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Columbia, 
Congo, Rep., Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Guatemala, Jordan, Laos, Madagascar, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Senegal, Slovenia, Thailand, Taiwan, 
Tunisia, UK, Uzbekistan, Vietnam  
2 Ratio of minimum wage to 
value added per worker 
3 Maximum working days per 
week 
Albania, Angola, Bangladesh, Cyprus, Greece, 
Namibia 
4 Premium for night work  Chile, Finland, Iceland, Slovenia, Switzerland 
5 Premium for work on weekly 
rest day  
Congo, Cyprus, Fiji, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Vietnam 
6 Paid annual leave Slovenia, Tunisia 
7 Severance pay for redundancy 
dismissal  
Brazil, Congo, Dominica, Ecuador, Madagascar, 
Senegal, Slovenia, Taiwan 
8 Notice period for redundancy 
dismissal 
Congo, Panama, Portugal, Slovenia, Tajikistan, 
Tunisia, UK, Uzbekistan 
Source: author  
Note: for factors 1 and 2 the signs of correlation coefficients are identical. 
 
The value added per worker as well as the labor productivity can increase due to investment 
and R&D, and some research argued that lower CIT rates have either a positive effect on these factors. 
(HM Treasury, 2013; Gravelle and Marples, 2014 etc) or any significant effect (Hungerford, 2014). 
Moreover, in the open economy the labor productivity declines due to capital outflow occurred as a 
result of increase in CIT rates (Diamond et al. 2013; Boghean and State, 2015), and according to 
Ogawa et al., (2016) in the unionized country such capital outflow reduces labor productivity 
(compared to the non-unionized country case).  
 
To provide comparative analysis of obtained results for 25 countries, in which the significant 
correlation between CIT rate change and minimum wage for a full-time worker/ ratio of minimum 
wage to value added per worker is observed, we used both labor force participation rate and labor 
productivity indicators.  
 
The results of analysis are presented on Fig. 3. 
Figure 3. Results of comparative analysis of countries with the significant correlation between CIT 
rate and minimum wage/ratio of minimum wage to value added per worker 
 
 
Source: author 
Note: ln (LFPR), ln (LP) are natural logarithms of labor force participation rate and labor productivity 
respectively 
 
Fig. 3 demonstrates that countries with lowest GDP per capita have upper middle levels of labor 
force participation rate while the labor productivity is rather low. It can be explained, ultimately, by 
a large number of low-skilled and unskilled jobs with simultaneous low value added per worker.  
In contrast, countries with highest GDP per capita with large share of R&D and highly skilled 
work have high labor productivity rates with labor force below average. 
Consequently, in countries with lower GDP per capita the negative significant correlation 
means that the increase in CIT rate leads to the decrease in ratio of minimum wage to value added 
per worker due to weak unions/labor protections, and because of large share of low-skilled jobs. 
Therefore, the increase in CIT rate affects labor productivity (that is contrary to Hungerford (2014).  
In contrast, the decrease in CIT rate leads to the increase in labor productivity resulting from 
capital inflow from unionized countries. The latter ties up with suggestions of Ogawa et al. (2016). 
In the non-unionized country, labor is paid according to its marginal product, while in the unionized 
state the labor is overpaid. In the open economy case, implying the integration of capital markets, the 
labor market of non-unionized country benefits from capital inflow. 
Countries with higher GDP per capita demonstrate the positive significant correlation between 
CIT rate and the ratio of minimum wage to value added per worker, which can be explained by 
a large share of tax-favored activity, which is mostly related to the R&D (for these countries 
Fig. 3 demonstrates high rates of labor productivity with average labor force participation rate); 
government incentive to take part in international tax competition to prevent capital outflow, 
notably from R&D sector (Sokolovska, 2016) and consequently to prevent the decrease of labor 
productivity (the higher is the tax rate, the higher is the labor productivity – as a result of tax 
incentives). 
 
  
5. Conclusion 
The tax theory suggests that in the open economy the corporate tax burden is partially (or entirely) 
shifted onto labor. This burden can be shifted either by cutting wages or by worsening employment 
conditions – in case when companies do not cut wages. 
The conditions of employment in countries worldwide generally can be determined by labor 
freedom index: the higher is its value the better are terms of employment in country (conditions for 
hiring and dismissals, rigidity of hours, amount of mandatory severance etc.). 
An empirical analysis for 145 countries demonstrated the negative and statistically significant 
relationship between labor freedom index and corporate tax rate, which varies depending on the level 
of GDP per capita. This could be evidence that corporate tax rate increase leads to the worsening 
employment of conditions since companies do not want or cannot to cut wages. Moreover, in 
countries with higher GDP per capita the strength of such relationship differs from countries where 
GDP per capita is relatively low.  
In terms of corporate tax incidence this means that in developed countries with higher GDP per 
capita the corporate tax burden is shifted onto workers (particularly, by worsening their employment 
conditions) in lesser extent compared with countries with relatively low GDP per capita. 
Further analysis for 62 countries with changes of CIT rates allowed to suggest that such change 
in countries with low GDP per capita affects labor productivity, identifying the potential tax 
incidence, due to a large share of labor force employed in low-skilled and unskilled jobs, and also 
due to capital inflow as a result of capital market integration, that affects labor market.  
For countries with higher GDP per capita is the suggested corporate tax incidence is determined 
by a significant part of tax-favored activity, notably R&D with high value added per worker, and also 
by government incentive participate in international tax competition. 
Consequently, the corporate tax incidence diversely affects the labor productivity in countries 
with different GDP per capita, and the direction of such impact is determined by composition of labor 
force and openness of economy.  
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